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INTERSECTORAL WAGE STRUCTURE IN COLOMBIA 
Gary S. Fields and Nohra de Marulanda 
I. Introduction 
Critical areas of interest in current studies of.economic 
development include the themes of income distribution, poverty, and employ­
ment generation. In the less developed countries, the majority of the 
economically active population obtain most or all of their incomes as 
fruits of their labor. For this reason, the structure arid functioning 
of the labor market play a key role in determining the distribution of 
economic well-being. 
A number of recent studies of LDC labor markets, including one 
1
by an author of this paper, have dealt with income determination at the 
individual level. The reason for this emphasis is clear: if we wish to 
understand the incomes and poverty among individuals, we must study 
individuals. Microeconomic research has convincingly demonstrated the 
important role that an individual's education and labor market experience 
play in determining his income. The results of these studies have been 
ti'sed by many governments as the basis for policy formulation pertaining 
to the supply side of the labor market, particularly as regards development. 
Without in any way downplaying the value of microeconomic studies 
of incomes, we would also observe that many government policies to alleviate 
poverty operate on the demand side of the labor market rather than the 
supply side. The question has been put to us in Colombia in the following 
see Fields (1975). 
1 
2. 
way: given that the government has $X which it wants to spend to stimulate 
employment growth by subsidizing certain sectors of the economy, where 
should the resources be allocated? We would not presume to attempt to 
dictate to policy-makers how public funds are best spent. Rather, our 
goal here is the more limited one of 'understanding the interindustry 
structure of wages and salaries in Colombia and determining the differ­
1
entiating characteristics of high wage and low wage industries. The 
other information needed to answer the policy question posed above --- i.e., 
sector-specific estimates of the employment elasticity of output --- must 
be left to other researchers. Still, if policy-makers know which are the 
relatively high wage sectors of the economy and what their characteristics 
are, they will have both a better basis for deciding which sectors might 
best be stimulated and some guidance on how to go about doing it. 
Our study of Colombia is based on a particularly comprehensive 
body of data which has recently become avail?ble. In the late 196Os, the 
Colombian national statistical office (DANE) conducted industrial surveys 
in fi¥e m~jor economic sectors (manufacturing, services, connnerce, mining, 
and government). For each of 82 two-digit industries (leather goods manu­
facturing, for example) data are available on wages and other labor force 
remuneration. These sectors employ some 2 1/2 million people, or 40% of 
2
Colombia's labor force. The most striking feature of the wage data is 
the considerable diversity in wages which one observes across the different 
our analysis is cross-sectional. Fbr an in-depth analysis of the time 
series pattern of wages within sectors of Colombian manufacturing, see 
Sanjin~s (1975). 
;anco de la Republica (1974, p. 24). 
1 
3. 
. 1subsectors. Average annualremuneration per worker was Col. $21,400. Around 
this mean, remuneration per wor½er ranged between Col. $5,000 in domestic 
services to Col. $122,500 in coal mining; with a standard deviation of 
Col.. $16,000. It is this diversity which we seek to account fqr in this 
paper. 
The variables used to explain intersectoral wage patterns 
include a number of characteristics of the firms which comprise each two­
digit subsector. These are: average productivity of workers in the 
industry, the capital-intensity of production methods, the size distri­
bution of firms within the sector, the importance of foreign capital, 
and the occupational composition of the industry's iabor force. 
Unfortunately, figures on unionism are not available, so we must account 
for unions' effects indirect~y via other variables. Our empirical results 
show that higher average wages in a sector are associated with each of 
these sectoral characteristics and that these factors are capable of 
explaining a very substantial percentage of the variance in average 
remuneration across sectors. 
The remainder of this study has six sections. Section II 
reviews the economic theory of wage differentials. In Section III, we 
state our hypotheses about intersectoral wage structure.in Colombia and 
explain our reasons for each. The definitions of the variables and the 
empirical specification appear in Section IV. Sections V and VI present 
the results of simple correlations and multiple regressions respectively. 
The paper concludes with.a policy discussion in Section VII. An appendix 
with the actual data follows the text. 
1All figures are expressed in 1967 Coiombian pesos and include wages 
(salarios) and fringe benefits (prestaciones sociales). 
Owing to incomolete coverage ;md nossible hiases ,mcl errors in renG:trtinr.,
it is wise to regard the sneciflc fir,;ures with caution. In coal minin?-, for 
examr,1e, it is r,rohahle that onlv the larr:er commercial mines ar,f'ear in the
samnle whereas the 1.rn:ill c11hc-.fc,+-~-~~ 1----' --- , •· • · 
2 
4. 
II. The Economic Theory of Wage Differentials 
In seeking to explain the considerable diversity of average wages 
across the various subsectors of the Colombian economy, our research is 
based on the maintained hypothesis that average wages in the different 
subsectors are systematically-related to a number of attributes of the 
fir~s comprising the industry. In other words, we are explicitly assuming 
the existence of a certain degree of disequilibrium in the Colombian 
economyo This point of view has become quite accepted in the literature 
on labor in economic development. See, for example, Reynolds (1965, 1969), 
Berg (1966, 1969), Frank (1968, 1971), Turnham (1971), and many of the 
I~L.Oo Mission Reports including that on Colombia (ILO (1970)). 
The usual starting point for analysis of LDC wage structures is 
standard textbook level economic theory, in which it is suggested that a 
worker 1 s production is greater the more complementary resources he has to 
work with. On the assumption that workers are paid the value of their 
marginal products, it is often argued that workers will be more highly­
paid in more capital-intensive industries or in industries where the 
value added per worker is higher: 





Market A Market B 
5. 
There is, unfortunately, a problem with this reasoning. Unless 
the difference between WA and WB is due to compensating differentials, the 
1
interindustry wage gap would not be expected to persist in the long run. 
In the absence of compensating differentials, the situation in Figure 1 
will be stable only if it is assumed that no mobility between the two 
l~bor markets takes place. However, .it has been demonstrated in the less 
developed countries in general and Colombia in particular that workers 
move from relatively disadvantageous labor markets to those with better 
. d. . 2economic con 1t1ons. Thus, an interindustry wage gap, as depicted by 
the difference between WA and WB in Figure 1, would tend to be eroded 
by market forces. 
The market forces might work in either of two ways. Suppose 
that workers are mobile and that wages are flexible. Workers would move 
from market A to market B until the two markets paid the same wage, with 
the overall wage level being determined by aggregate labor supply and 
demand: 





L L L 
Market A Market B Aggregate Labor Market 
1This was recognized by Adam Smith. A penetrating essay on the process 
by which the labor force is allocated among alternative labor markets, 
including a review of classical writings, is that of Rottenberg (1956). 
2For a review of this literature, see Todaro (1975). With particular 
reference to Colombia, see McGreevey (1968), the report of the ILO mission 
to Colombia (ILO (1970), Chapter 7 and Appendix 5), and the reference cited 
therein. 
6. 
Thus, whatever wage differential might be observed would be only a short 
run disequilibrium phenomenon, 
Market forces might also work but on a more limited basis. 
Suppose once again that workers are mobile but that wages in market B 
are inflexible downward. Perceiving 'that more could be earned in B, 
workers would move to B until the expected wage in B (actual wage adjusted 
for the probability of employment) were equal to the actual wage in A 
(see Harris and Todaro (1970)),but the wage differential among employed 
workers would still persist. 
The point of this discussion is that the persistence of wage 
differentials in different economic sectors is inconsistent with the 
free operation of equilibrating forces as posited in the ordinary textbook­
level competitive theory, To explain a persistently. unequal wage structure, 
the standard coi:npetitive theory must be amended to allow for other market 
in order to reducemotivations of firms (such as paying higher wages 
labor turnover costs or improving worker efticiency) and to allow also 
for the influence on wages of institutional forces. In Section III, we 
draw on these market and institutional forces to formulate a number of 
hypotheses about the relationship between the characteristics of firms 
in an economic subsector and the average wages paid to that sector's 
workers. 
7. 
III. Hypotheses on the Determinants of Intersectoral Wage Structure in 
Colombia 
Hypothesis 1. Sectors with higher value added per worker pay 
higher wages ceteris paribus. 
Hypothesis 2. More capital'-intensive sectors pay higher wages 
ceteris paribus. 
The available studies·for Colombia have found a positive correlation 
between the level of wages and value added per worker (which, following 
custom, we shall cal 1 'productivity') and the wage level and capital 
intensity. 
1 
There is no consensus as to why this is. 
As we observed in the preceeding section, textbook-level 
economic theory predicts the same wage for comparable workers provided 
the equilibrating forces in labor markets are freely~functioning. If all 
workers were identical, even if firms differed in 'productivity' the wages 
they pay would be equal, as determined by th~ labor market. Consider, for 
example, an industry in which two production technologies dominate all 
2
others. 
Technology A Technology B 
Product 100 units 100 units 
Labor utilization 200 workers 100 workers 
Labor cost -$2, 000 $1,000 
(wage= $10) 
- continued -
1 see Urrutia (1968), Sanjines (1975), and Heady (1976). 
2
The lack of a clearly-dominant technology is consistent with either 
(a) a limited number of available factor proportions (see Eckaus (1955)) 
or (b) indivisibility of capital. 
8. 
Technology A Technology B 
Capital utilization 1 machine 2 machine 
Cost of capital 
(Price of machine= $1,000) $1,000 $2,000 
Capital per worker $5 $20 
Value added $3,000 $3,000 
Value added per 
worker= 'productivity" $15 $30 
It is clear that the firms in the industry would be indifferent between 
A and B, since they obtain the same output for the same cost. Being 
indifferent, some would choose A while others choose B, the choice being 
made more or less arbitrarily. The two groups of firms would pay the 
same wage but would differ with respect to value added per worker 
( 
1 productivity1 ) and capital~intensity. In this case, 1 productivity' and 
capital-intensity would have no significant relation with wage rates. 
Since we do observe wage differentials and these differentials 
~ associated with value added per worker and capital-intensity, the 
simple textbook theory cannot suffice. One reason may be that the 
equilibrating forces are not free to operate.· A considerable amount of 
labor mobility might be impeded by restrictions on entry, lack of infor-
mation, or costs of movement, for example. Wages may be prevented from 
falling due to institutional rigidities caused by labor unions, minimum 
wage legislation, government wage policy, and the like. The higher wage 
would induce firms to move up their labor demand curves and emply fewer 
workers. There would then arise a correlation between the wage in an 
economic sector and the value added per employed worker, which is what 
wear measuring by 'productivity'. 
9. 
Another possibility is that the association between wages, 
productivity, and capital-intensity reflects other economic motivations 
of firms not captured in standard textbook-level theory. These lines of 
reasoning have been developed extensively by Stiglitz (1974a, -1974b). 
Stiglitz notes that firms receive a benefit by paying higher wages, 
either by reducing labor turnover costs or by raising worker efficiency. 
In the turnover argument, the higher is the firm's wage relative to the 
market wage, the larger is the pool of available job applicants and the 
lower is the quit rate among existing personnel, and thus the lower are 
the costs of hiring, training, and work disruptions. In the efficiency 
wage model, higher wages bring forth greater effort, for either motiva­
tional or nutritional reasons. In either case, Stiglitz posits that 
the firm weighs the costs of a high wage policy against the potential 
benefits and raises wages if the benefits exceed the costs. 
Consider now the implications of these additional economic 
considerations for wage structure. Firms with relatively capital-intensive 
interdependent technologies might be expected to find high wage policies 
particularly advantageous for the reasons just mentioned. In the 
automobile assembly lines, for example, any damage to the machinery or 
underutilization of it due to absenteeism becomes extremely costly. To 
avoid these unfortunate events, automobile firms might raise their wages 
to assure themselves of a sufficient number of experienced workers. In 
this case, greater value added (per time period, not per worker, but the 
two are probably closely-related) and greater capital-intensity provide 
the economic rationale for higher wages. 
A related argument has to do with labor unions. While very 
little is known about the Colombian labor movement, it is clear that 
1 
unions in some firms or industries are more powerful than in others. 
It has been observed in the United States that unions possess greater 
negotiating power in highly-profitable industries~ apparently because 
. 2 
the cost of a strike is higher when more profits are foregone. Insofar 
as profits are related to value added and capital-intensity (a not 
anunreasonable assumption in Colombia), labor unions may be providing 
additional impetus for higher wages to be paid in the high 'productivity', 
highly capital-intensive sectors. 
It is important to note that all of the above arguments pertain 
to wage differentials among homogeneous workers. Of course, nobody would 
seriously argue that, as an empirical matter, labor is homogeneous, To 
the contrary, it is generally believed that certain groups of workers 
(the better-educated, for example) are inherently more productive than 
others. If competition in the labor market is at all prevalent, firms 
would be observed competing for the scarce pool of relatively able workers 
and would thereby bid their wages up. Gradually, a wage structure would 
evolve, with the more able members of the work force being rewarded by 
higher wages for their superior productivity. 
Heterogeneity of the labor force poses a formidable problem for 
interpreting an association between average wages in an economic sector 
and value added and capital-intensity per worker. The difficulty is that 
these variables are denominated in non-standard units of 'labor,' and thus 
1
The standard reference on labor unions in Colombia is Urrutia (1969). 
2
The theoretical arguments and empirical evidence are summarized in 
Levinson (1967). 
11. 
are not very well-measured. We may illustrate the problem with ,eference 
to labor unions. As .we have seen, one school of thought holds that the 
greater bargaining power of certain labor unions as compared with others 
originates in the presence of large profits in an industry or the absence 
of alternative production methods involving non-union labor. When a 
union raises wages, the higher wages serve to attract a larger pool of 
workers, and the employer can then choose the best workers from the 
available pool. On the other hand, it is also argued that those labor 
unions composed of inherently more productive workers enjoy greater 
negotiating power and are thus able to secure higher wages· for their 
members. In the first explanation, we observe a causal relation running 
from higher wages to higher productivity, while in the second case, the 
causality is the reverse. Hence, higher 'productivity' in ope sector as 
compared with another may be the consequence of higher wages achieved by 
1unions and not the cause of the higher wages. Therefore, while an assoc­
iation between wages, value added per worker, and capital per worker would 
be consistent with the view that workers in high productivity sectors are 
rewarded by higher wages, perhaps with their unions inducing the firms to 
1The absence of data for Colombia on union membership or power do not permit 
us to test among the alternatives mentioned. However, .it is interesting to 
note that in the United States, where this type of information is available, 
Weiss (1966) and Ashenfelter and Johnson (1972) observed a wage differential 
due to unions of about 20%. They also found that unionized firms attract 
workers with more education and more experience. After adjusting the wage 
differential for these differences, Weiss found that unionized workers re­
ceived wages similar to those received by comparable workers elsewhere and 
Ashenfelter and Johnson found that the union effect was not ignificani::ly
different from zero. Thus, it may be concluded that one important effect 
of unions was to reallocate more productive workers to firms or industries 
which are forced by union pressure to pay higher wages. 
12. 
share a part of their profits, it would also be consistent with the view 
that higher wages alter the skill mix but leave labor's share relatively 
unchanged. 
In surrn:nary, we have isolated four reasons why firms with higher 
'productivity' or greater capital-intensity might pay higher wages. These 
are: lack of equilibriation in labor markets, firms' responses to a more 
complex set of economic forces than are usually considered, the impact of 
labor unions, and the lack of standardization for labor quality, partic­
ularly in capital-intensive processes. We reiterate that only some of 
these arguments apply to homogeneous labor. In others, there is nothing 
to indicate that groups of comparable workers receive hig.her wages if 
they work in sectors where value-added per worker and capital-intensity 
are high. To the contrary, it is precisely because those workers are 
better that their wages are higher. 
Hypothesis 3. Sectors with proportionaly more large firms pay 
higher wages ceteris paribus. 
There is considerable evidence that large firms in Colombia 
. 1 
pay higher wages. We hypothesize that the effect of the variable "size 
-of firm" remains even after controlling·for the influence of other 
variables, in particular productivity and capital-intensity. There are 
three reasons for this hypothesis •. 
The first reason is the simple technological point that there 
tends to be greater interdependence among workers in large firms than in 
small firms. With this greater interdependence comes the need for a more 
See, for example, Nelson, Schultz, and Slighton (1971), Chapter 5. 
1 
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reliable work force, which is obtained through higher wages. The argument 
here is identical with that made earlier concerning the hypothesized 
relationship between capital-intensity and wages. 
Secondly, there are other variables affecting wages for which 
size of firm is probably a proxy. Consider, for example, the effect of 
. 1 
monopoly power in the product market, In general, we would expect that 
firms which operate within monopolistic markets would pe earning greater 
profits, and these firms-would therefore have greater ability and incentive 
to pay higher wages. The monopolistic sectors would tend to be composed 
of relatively more large firms. Hence, in a cross section regression, we 
would find that economic sectors with more large firms would pay higher 
wages. 
Finally, there is a connection between firm size and labor union 
activity. Colombian labor law prohibits the formation of unions in firms 
with fewer than 25 workers. Therefore, the more large firms there are 
in an economic sector, the more likely there are to be unions able to 
exert power to secure higher wages for their members. Data limitations 
prohibit the direct testing of unions' influence in large firms. 
Hypothesis 4. Sectors which have proportionately more foreign 
investment or foreign capital pay higher wages ceteris paribus. 
There is no reason inherent in the functioning of the labor 
market why higher wages would be paid in sectors with large concentrations 
of foreign investment or capital apart from the possibility that these 
firms may be more capital-intensive or have more large firms, which would 
For an analysis of the role of product market considerations on wages in 
less developed countries with particular reference to Colombia, see Heady (1976) 
1 
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presumably be reflected in the tes.ts of Hypotheses 2 and 3. However, 
foreign firms in Colombia have been observed to pay higher wages 
l 
and 
various political o~ institutional reasons can be offered to explain this 
phenomenon. For example, one such reason is the desire of multinational 
firms in these sectors to maintain good public relations in the receiver 
country. Another reason is to avoid large wage differentials between 
foreign executives and nationals of the host country, and in turn, 
between nationals in executive positions and other personnel, also 
nationals. Also, it should be pointed out that foreign firms are probably 
on average more profitable than locals, and therefore possess greater 
capacity to pay higher wages due to pressures from unions or other sources. 
For all these reasons, we expect to find foreign firms paying higher wages. 
Once again, our hypothesis is multivariate, insofar as we hypothesize 
that the extent of foreign investment or capital contributes additional 
independent explanatory power even in the presence of productivity, 
capital-intensity,and size. 
Hypothesis 5. Those sectors which have a higher proportion of 
white-collar worker~ (empleados) as compared with blue-collar workers 
{obreros) pay higher wages ceteris paribus. 
Obreros are those who work directly with the industry's product 
while empleados do not; see the appendix for the precise definitions. 
In general, the category empleados includes higher-level occupations, 
such as professionals, managers, and office and clerical workers. Thus, 
we may regard the variable 'proportion white-collar' -as a good approx­
imation to the occupational composition of the sector in question. We 
see Diaz-Alejandro (1974). 
1 
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hypothesize that sectors with larger proportions of white-collar workers 
pay higher wages ceteris paribus, i.e., even after standardizing for 
productivity, capital-intensity, etc. 
16. 
IV. ·Empirical Specification and Data 
The sources of information are the sectoral surveys carried out 
by the national statistical office DANE (Departamento Administrativo 
Nacional de Estadistica) between 1967 and 1970. The sectors in question 
are: industrial manufacturing, connnerce, services, mining, and government. 
These five sectors are comprised of 82 subsectors and include 40% of 
Colombia's economically active population. In the appendix, we present 
a detailed description of the data and sources of information used in 
this study. 
The variable to be explained is: 
AVGREM. Average Remuneration. 
AVGREM is equal to the sum of basic wages and salaries plus 
fringe benefits (prestaciones sociales) divided by the number of remun­
erated workers. 
The definitions of the explanatory variables are: 
PROD. Productivity. 
PROD is value added per worker divided by the number of 
remunerated workers. 
CAPINT. Capital Intensity. 
This variable is defined differently in the sectors in which it 
appears due to lack of consistent data. In the industrial manufacturing 
sector, capital intensity is approximated by installed electrical capacity 
(measured in horse-power) per remunerated worker. In the mining sector, 
capital intensity is taken as electric usage (in kilowatt hours) per 
remunerated worker. 
17. 
SIZE. Size of Firm. 
Size of firm is equal to the proportion of establishments with 
more than 50 employees. 
FOREIGN. Importance of Foreign Investment or Foreig"n Capital. 
This variable is defined differently in the various sectorsJ 
which is because of lack of a consistent data series. In the manufacturing 
sector, FOREIGN is equal to the ratio of foreign investment to total 
investment. In the commerce and service sectors, it is the ratio of 
foreign capital to total capital. 
WHTCOL. Importance of White Collar Employment. 
WHTCOL is equal to th.e number of empleados (roughlyJ the number 
of white collar workers) as a percentage of the total remunerated labor 
force. 
Our model therefore is: 
AVGRE'.M =a+ S
1 PROD+ S2 CAPINT + S3 SIZE 
+ s FOREIGN+ s WHTCOL + E4 5 
We hypothesize sl, S2, S3, S4J S5 > o. 
Unfortunately, as is evident from the above descriptions, not 
all variables are available for all 82 subsectors. The availability of 
data is summarized in the .following table: 
18. 
Manufacturing Connnerce Services Mining Government 
AVGREM X X X X X 
PROD X X 
CAPINT X X' 
SIZE X X X 
FOREIGN X X X 
WHTCOL X X X X * 
X = Data available 
= All government workers are classified as empleados;* 
therefore, government workers are excluded from 
what follows. 
We turn now to the empirical results. We present first the 
results of the simple correlations and then of the multiple regression. 
19. 
V. Results of Simple Tabulations and Correlations 
Tabl,e 1 pre_sents the average remuneration (AVGREM) in subsectors 
classified by the characteristics described in the preceeding section. 
AVGREM appears to be positively-related, as hypothesized, to each of the 
following: value-added per worker (PROD), capital-intensity (CAPINT), 
percentage of establishments with more than 50 workers (SIZE), importance 
of foreign capital or investment (FOREIGN), and proportion white-collar 
(WHTCOL). Considering the basis in past empirical research for these 
hypothesis, the overall strength of these results is not particularly 
surprising. 
To test the statistical significance of these patterns, we 
computed a set of simple correlation coefficients, which are presented 
in Table 2. Each of the variables shows a statistically sig~ificant 
positive correlation with AVGREM (.05 significance level, one-tail test). 
These results provide only partial confirmation of our hypotheses, however, 
since each of the hypotheses is formulated ceteris paribus and nothing 
has been standardized for in these tabulations and correlations. Hence, 
we must look at the multiple regression results, presented in Section VI. 
20. 
TABLE 1. AVERAGE REMUNERATION IN COLOMBIA BY VARIOUS SECTOR CHARACTERISTICS 
Characteristic 
Value-Added per Worker (Col. $)(PROD)a) 
< 25,000 
25,000 - 50,000 
over 50,000 
Capital Intensity (HP/L)(CAPINT)b) 
0-5 
>5 
Percentage of Establishments 












a) Manufacturing, Mining 
b) Manufacturing only 















































* +. 83 
* +.64 
* +.so· 




















a) Manufacturing, Mining 
b) Manufacturing, Commerce, Services 
c) Manufacturing, Mining, Corrnnerce, Services 
*=Statistically significant correlation, 
005 level, one-tail test 
22. 
VI.· Multiple Regression Results 
Our hypotheses of Section III and the model 
AVGREM = CY + !\ PROD + S2 CAPINT + S3 SIZE 
+ S
4 FOREIGN + s5 WHTCOL + E 
were formulated to test whether each of the explanatory variables has 
an independent effect on the dependent variable AVGREM. The multiple 
regression model lets us observe whether the influence of any of the 
independent variables is weakened by the presence of others, i.e., 
whether the relationship between the dependent variable and any particular 
independent variable are truly ceteris paribus. Consider, for example, 
the relationship between size of firm and capital-intensity. It is 
well-known that large firms in Col~mbia use more capital-intensive pro-
. 1duction techniques. , Are wages higher in these firms, because they are 
large or because they are capital-intensive, or does each factor provide 
additional explanatory power beyond that contributed by the other? An 
examination of multiple regression coefficients .will give the answer. 
The regression results are given in Table 3. The hypotheses of 
Section III receive substantial support. Three of the variables in 
question --- PROD,FOREIGN,AND WHTCOL ~-- are highly significant with 
positive signs each time they are encountered, thus confirming Hypotheses 
1, 4 and 5. With respect to Hypotheses 2 and 3 (CAPINT and SIZE), the 
results vary from one sector to the next. The effect of capital intensity 
(CAPINT) is found to be statistically significant in manufacturing but not 
in mining. The poor result in mining may reflect poor quality data; as 
1
The simple correlation coefficient between SIZE and CAPINT in Colombian
manufacturing is +o.42. 
2Cf. footnote 2, page 3. 
23. 
witnessed by the very large variation in the capital intensity variable 
reported in Table A.4. In the case of the large firm variable SIZE, its 
effect is significantly greater than zero in manufacturing, nearly so in 
1coIIllllerce, and clearly insignificant in services. 
Overall, the regression results are quite good. The proportion 
of variance explained ranges from 83% in corrnnerce and services to 95% in 
manufacturing. This is a strong finding and compares favorably with the 
explanatory power of other studies of Colombian wage structure. 
2 
It might be objected that one possible reason for the high 
explanatory power is the close relationship between occupational composi­
tion, as measured by WIITCOL, a~d the average wage AVGREM. To gauge the 
importance of WHTCOL vis a vis the remaining explanatory variables, we 
re-ran each of the regressions with WHTCOL omitted. The results are 
reported in Table 4. As compared with those in Table 3, we note a 
decline in R
2 
ranging from four percentage points in manufacturing up to 
a 27 percentage point decline in services. Still, the overall explanatory 
2 power of the regressions remains high (R = .91 in manufacturing, 
• 73 in mining, .64 in commerce, and .56 in services). Furthermore, and 
1It is interesting to note that it is the manufacturing sector in which 
the effects of CAPINT and SIZE are statistically significant, and that 
these effects are not significant in the other sectors in which they appear.
One possible explanation is the fact that similar industrial surveys had 
been conducted previously in manufacturing, whereas the surveys in the 
other sectors were done for the first time. It is quite possible, therefore, 
that meas.urement errors are greater outside of manufacturing, which would 
tend to weaken the statistical results in those other sectors. 
2
See Sanjines (1975) and· Heady (1976). 
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equally important, each of the other ind<i!pendent variables retains its 
statistical significance (or lack thereof). 
Based on these findings, we arrive at the following principal 
result: 
Certain aspects of the industrial structure in Colombia are 
systematically associated with the wage structure, Higher 
wages are observed in those sectors characterized by higher 
value-added per worker, more foreign capital or investment, 
a higher percentage of large firms, greater capital-intensity, 
and more white-collar workers. Each of these factors has an 
additional influence beyond that contributed by· the other 
variables. 
While the effects of these variables are independent one from 
another in their influence on wage structure, we cannot be sure that they 
are independent of the omitted variables, in particular, those pertaining 
to the quality of the labor force. We have hypothesized, for example, 
that firms which are large and/or capital-intensive may require better­
skilled workers due to the greater interdependence of their production 
.methods, and so will pay higher wages in order to attract qualified workers. 
The regression coefficients on these variables would then reflect both the 
direct effect of size or capital-~ntensity on wages fo¼ workers in a given 
skill category and also the indirect effeGt of these characteristics in 
inducing firms to employ more highly-skilled workers. The task of dis­
tinguishing the direct from the indirect effects is left to future research, 
In interpreting these results, we would infer that both market 
and institutional influences are at work in determining wage structure in 
25. 
Colombia. While it is possible to offer market explanations for the 
observed relationships, we would hold that wage differentials of the 
observed magnitudes·--- for example, 60% higher wages on average in the 
largest size category than in the smallest --- cannot be fully explained 
by assumed productivity considerations alone. It appears to us that an 
important independent influence is also exerted by labor unions, government 
pressures and legislation, and wage policies of large and/or multi-national 
corporations. This speculation cannot be verified with the available data. 
It would seem, though, that one would be hard-pressed to interpret the 
data as demonstrating that these institutional influences are absent. 
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TABLE 3 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS WITHIN SECTORS OF THE COLOMBIAN ECONOMY, 
ALL FIRM CHARACTERISTICS INCLUDED 
Manufacturing Commerce Services Mining 
0.12PROD 0.06 
(4.93) (5.89) 
CAPINT 216.51 0.09 
(3.00) (. 56) 
SIZE 123.60 266.31 56.19 
(2.66). (1.39) (. 63) 
FOREIGN 139.70 270.75 350.29 
(1. 98) (2.99) (5.90) 
WHTCOL 24,279.82 33,557.26 18,165.93 54,395.15 
(3.38) (4.30) (5.06) (3. 77) 
CONSTANT 7,232.59 2,562.03 6,122.15 5,402.30 
R2 ·.95 .83 .83 .94 
N (Number of 
Subsectors) 20 22 19 8 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses 
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TABLE 4 
MULTIPLE REGRESSION RESULTS WITHIN SECTORS OF THE COLOMBIAN ECONOMY, 
PROPORTION WHITE COLLAR EXCLUDED 
Manufacturing Commerce Services Mining 
PROD 0;07 0.13 
(4. 73) (3. 61) 
-0.18CAPINT 233.03 
(2. 48) (.63) 
SIZE 171.68 439.15 5.27 
(2. 98) (1.69) (.04) 
FOREIGN 187.07 458.63 388.52 
(2.08) (4.16) (4.14) 
CONSTANT 10,327.13 12,507.79 11,361.99 24,146.71 
R2 .91 .64 .56 .73 
N (Number of 
Subsectors) 20 22 19 8 
Note: t-statistics in parentheses 
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VII. What We Have Learned and What Lies Ahead 
The Colombian government has the objective of increasing the 
economic well-being of the poorest 50% of the population. Given that 
objective, and given the fact that most people receive most of .their income 
from the work they do, the obvious need for public policy is to raise the 
rate of pay received by the poor. Toward this end, Colombian policy-makers 
are following a two-pronged strategy of enlarging the modern sector to 
absorb an increasing share of the economically active population in 
relatively remunerative activities while simultaneously seeking to provide 
those who remain in the traditional sector with more complementary 
resources. Planning for modern sector enlargement is typically done in 
sectoral terms, with the government trying to create more adequate-paying 
jobs by stimulating certain sectors of the economy or certain types of 
enterprises. 
The main contribution of this paper has been to identify the 
high wage sectors and to describe their characteristics. We have found 
that five sectoral characteristics --- value added per worker, capital­
intensity of production, degree of foreign capital or investment, importance 
of large firms, and occupational distribution --- have significant 
independent effects on wages. 
Our results leave little doubt about the importance of these 
characteristics of the firms in an industry in explaining intersectoral, 
wage structure in Colombia. The role of the characteristics of the workers 
in an economic subsector has not been examined here. However, microeconomic 
studies have demonstrated convincingly that there is a systematic relation­
ship between an individual's personal· characteristics and his wage. 
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Together these results suggest that the Colombian wage structure is 
determined by a complex combination of institutional and market forces, 
the exact mechanisms of which are not yet fully understood. 
A related question with substantial policy-relevance· is the 
relative importance of individual as opposed to industrial characteristics 
in wage determination. At the industry level, this might be studied by 
including worker characteristics in interindustry regressions of the 
sort reported in this paper. Alternatively, at the microeconomic level, 
we might match up the individual with the distribution of firms in his 
subsector,classified according to size, degree of foreign ownership, 
capital-intensity, etc. and ther regressing the individual's income on 
his characteristics and those of his industry. This might provide some 
useful input into decisions on such policy questions as whether the 
government should seek to encourage multinational firms which pay high 
wages or whether they should instead use their resources to subsidize 
education or vocational training. More generally, should government 
stimulate production and industrialization on the demand side of the 
labor market or should they instead work toward skill intensification on 
the supply side] This awaits additional researchQ 
In the economy of an LDC like Colombia where budgetary resources 
are scarce, the government cannot act in all areas at once. Policy planners 
must evaluate the various possibilities in terms of their cost effectiveness, 
i.e., the number of jobs created per peso expended. This requires detailed 
knowledge of the employment-generation effects of alternative economic 
development policies, e.g., stimulus of large, foreig_n-owned firms which 
pay high wages versus small firms with intermediate technologies which 
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pay lower wages. Research on this question is notably lacking and badly­
needed. 
Finally, we are aware that our analysis has left out of 
consideration that part of the population which receives non-wage income, 
most importantly, the self-employed and small farmers who receive most 
of their income in kind rather than in cash. Agricultural incomes are 
undoubtedly detennined ·by a quite different set of fore.es than incomes 
in other sectors of the economy. The enormous statistical difficulties 
of treating income in kind make the problem virtually intractable on a 
sectoral basis. Future investigations in these areas are essential if 
we are to really understand the determinants of incomes among Colombia's 
target group --- the poorer 50o/~ 
APPENDIX 
A. Data Sources 
The sources used to obtain data for the five sectors (and sub­
sectors thereof) of the Colombian economy are listed below. 
Industrial Sector 
Information on the industrial sector was obtained from the 1967 
DANE Annual Manufacturing Survey (Encuesta Anual Mantifacturera de 1967). 
This survey covers a wide spectrum of industries including establish­
ments employing five or more persons and having a production volume of 
no less than 24,000 pesos. 





5. Clothing and footwear 
6. Wood 
7. Wooden furniture 
8. Paper and its products 
9. Printing 
10. Leather 
11. Rubber and its products 
12. Chemicals 
13. Petroleum derivatives 
14. Non-metallic minerals 
15. Basic metals 
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16. Metallic products 
17. Non-electric machinery 
18. Electric machinery 
19. Transportation material 
20. Diverse industries 
Commerce and Services 
For the commerce and service sectors, the data source was the 1970 
DANE Census of Connnerce and Services (Censo Grande de Comercio y 
Servicios de 1970). 
The commerce sector is divided into 13 wholesale trade subsectors 
and 9 retail trade subsectors; the service sector consists of 19 subsectors: 
Wholesale Trade 
1. Non-processed agricultural products 
2. Metallic minerals and fuels 
3. Industrial chemical products 
4. Sawed lumber and construction materials 
5. Machinery and related materials 
6. Vehicles, automobiles and accessories 
7. Hardware and electrical products 
8. Foodstuffs and beverages 
9. Non-manufactured textile products 
10. Clothing and accessories 
11. Furniture and l:10usehold accessories 




1.. General merchandise 
2. Grocery stores 
3. Clothing and footwear 
4. Pharmaceuticals 
5. Furniture and household utensils 
6. Porcelain and glass 
7. Vehicles, motorcycles, bicycles 
8. Fuel distributors 
9. Non classified 
Services 
1. Restaurants, cafes and others 
2. Hotels, boarding houses and others 
3. · •Transportation services 
4. Storage deposits 
5, Real estate 
6. Publicity services 
7. Services rendered to businesses 
8. Renting of machinery and equipment 
9. Renting of non-specified machinery and equipment 
10. Communal and social services 
11. Footwear repairs and others 
12. Electrical goods repair shops 
13. Automobile repair shops 
14. Watch and jewelry repair shops 
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15. Other repair services 
16. Laundry services 
17. Domestic services 
18. Photographic studios 
19. Non-specified personal services 
Mining Sector 
Data for this sector were obtained from the 1969 DANE Census on 
Mines and Quarries (Censo de Minas y Canteras) which includes 203 of 
the most important establishments of this sector. The mining sector 
is divided into the following_S types of activities: 
1. Operation of coal mines 
2. Metallic minerals excluding precious metals 
3. Crude oil and natural gas 
4. Operation of salt mines 
5. Extraction of stone, clay and ·sand 
6. Operation of emerald mines 
7. Precious metals 
8. Operation of other mines 
Government 
Information for the government sector was obtained from the 1967 
DANE Annual Report on Fiscal, Administrative and Financial Statistics 
(Informe Anual de Estadisticas Fiscales Administrativas y Financieras 
de 1967). 
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Only national employees were selected from this source since sex­
specific data were not available for departmental and municipal employees. 
Figures refer to the following 13 administrative divisions: 
1. Direction of public administration 
2. Justice and interior order 
3. International relations 
4. Tax collection 
5. National public services 
6. National defense 
7. Education and culture 
8. Public assistance and hygiene 
9. Labor and social security 
10. Economic development 
11. Control and fiscalization 
12. Statistics 
13. Miscellaneous services 
B. Definitions of Variables 
This section enumerates upon the variable definitions and, in some 
cases, explains the way they were modified for this study. 
Average Remuneration 
"Global salary" is used, which is defined as the basic salary 
expenditure plus fringe benefits divided by the number of remunerated 
workers in each sector and subsector. To make the figures comparable, 
remunerations in the trade, services and mining sectors are adjusted to 
1967 pesos, using an average of the price indices for blue and white 
collar workers, which in 1969 and 1970 were 115.0 and 123.1 respectively. 
Number of Remunerated Workers 
Labor force figures are broken down by sex among both blue and white 
collar workers who received some type of remuneration (in money or in 
kind), omitting owners, partners and their families. 
The difference between blue collar and white collar workers is that 
a·blue collar worker (obrero) performs physical chores whereas a white 
collar worker (empleado) performs clerical and administrative duties. 
Blue collar workers within the manufacturing sector include the 
workers and their apprentices; within the commerce sector blue collar 
include salespeople and service personnel; within the service sector, 
auxiliary personnel along with those rendering the service directly; and 
within mining both specialized and non-specialized laborers are included. 
White collar workers in the manufacturing sector include adminis­
trative personnel and technicians; in the commerce and service sectors, 
national and foreign directors and office personnel; and in the mining 
sector, administrative employees. All workers in the government sector 
were classified· as white collar. 
Participation of Foreign Investm~nt 
This refers to the proportion 6f investment originating from 
foreign sources and was available for the subsectors'of manufacturing. 
It is the ratio of foreign investment t6 net fixed investment. Net 
fixed investment includes expenditures during the year (purchases and/or 
own production) by industry and additions of new durable goods to their 
stocks of fixed assets, excluding sales of similar goods. Figures on 
foreign investment were transformed into 1967 pesos, using the annual 
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average of the official exchange rate, which was Col. $14. 73 per U.S. 
dollar. 
Participation of Foreign Capital 
This information was available in the commerce and service sectors. 
It is the ratio of foreign capital to total capital. 
Average Productivity 
Average productivity was defined as gross value added divided by the 
total number of paid workers. This variable was defined only for those 
sectors directly related to the process of production, namely the manu­
facturing and mining sectors. The value added of the latter sector was 
adjusted to 1967 prices using the same index by which remunerations were 
deflated. 
Capital Intensity 
In the manufacturing sector, capital intensity is approximated by· 
installed electrical energy capacity in horsepower units divided by 
the number of remunerated workers. In the mining sector, the variable 
is electrical energy consumption in kilowatt hours divided by the number 
of remunerated workers. These two measures were used alternatively 
in the analyses of the respective sectors. 
Size 
For the manufacturing, services, and commerce sectors, for which 
data were available, establishment size was measured by the number of 
workers employed. The size variable used was the number of establishments 
with 50 or more employees in each sub-sector. 
C. The Data 

























Number of Estnblishments bv Size (Ko. 
5-9 10-19 20-49 50-74_ 75-99 
of Worke~s2 
100+ ':0t· 
0101 15. 752 22.98;3 9. 207 6. 757 1. 868 489.333 3. 360 o. 68 59. 832 5.34 1. 230 978 352 226 55 28 67 2. 9: 
0102 28. 293 8. 798 1. 062 4. 731 656 117. 807 133 0.19 135. 923 4.63 53 45 29 24 13 10 46 ;: 
0103 23.414 1.461 1. 452 287 91 4.421 0 0 185.033 1. 36 · 52 56 28 13 3 0 9 1, 
0104 20. 120 25.057 14.216 5. 323 1. 502 212.973 13. 396 6. 28 43.435 3.35 100 83 65 92 31 10 61 4. 
0105 9.544 7.842 16.067 1.811 1. 259 24.450 0 0 23.863 0.49 76 7 509 212 176 48 24 44 :. 7 
CLOS 11. 390 4.934 305 605 143 20.541 0 0 25. 107 5.44 134 135 83 ·34 5 1 14 4 
0107 11. 451 3.899 279 403 178 6.368 0 0 19. 764 1. 68 126 139 63 49 5 3 5 3 
0103 25.341 3.404 1. 165 1. 219 304 108.835 313 o. 28 64.430 11. 35 6 15 27 36 8 7 11 l 
01G9 18. 571 6. 591 2.114 2. 029 715 22. 753 0 0 41. 722 0.99 96 147 128 70 13 6 17 4 









































































































































































0120 16.652 4. 771 2. 6 l6 1. 372 568 59. 719 0 0 44.168 1. 96 55 76 57 70 23 13 20 3 
Sources: tA:l_E, Encucs ta i\nual l-'..:mu:acturera and Bcl.etin de Estadfatica No. 239, pp. 70-71 




Average Number of Rem1.1nerated Workers r.112ital ..Sub Remuner• Blue - Collar T,!hite -. Collar Total Foreign F/T Number of Establishments b~ Size !No• of workers)Sec:tor ntion Men Women 
-- Men Women {Thousands) (Thousands) {%) <5 5-9 10-19 ~0-49 50_:74_~75-99 -- lOo+ -- Total 
0201 13. 185 441 58 121 57 22. 286 0 0 1 13 6 6 0 1 20202 33.430 713 47 29757 1.61 480. 371 54.227 11. 28 2 22 23 12 3 1 2 650203 42.999 661 86 707 412 132.848 58.332 43.90 2 14 17 11 00204 16.424 4 6 54931 78 286 212 ll8. 966 0 0 5 46 40 16 5 0 0 1120205 29. 411 961 109 923 439 169.861
0206 21. 17 5 1. or,~ 84 667 
18. 959 11. 16 4 27 25 33 6 1 3 99438 108. 781 73. 184 35.05 l 34 47 27 6 2 1 1180207 18.575 1. 434 99 624 424 194.506 0 0 6 57 59 34 5 l l 1630208 18.888 3. 076 639 1. 137 700 301. 866 34.664
0209 19. 8711 1. 629 647 728 
11.48 16 156 116 44 6 2 8 . 348 
706 233.402 0 0 1 42 110 58 5 1 0 2170210 19. 284 L 112 514 531 438 152. 241 4.663 3. 06 6 60 67 34 2 0 3 1720211 30. 31,4 755 281 594 292 89.217 22. 716 25.46 4 26 23 8 0 0 4 650212 24.874 t. 348 232 1. 260 581 l56.831 11. 838 7.54 3 21 29 370213 24. 132 13 5 5 1132. 159 370 1. 346 689 303.839 59. 569 . 9219. 60 13 75 38 5 1 7 231022L 9.016 2.258 12.425 852 739 257.018 4.010 1. 56 36 223 152 70 26 16 556 .0222 11. 566 3. 753 2. 591 l. 219 768 314.663 2.067 0.65 74 254 104 
33 
0223 10. 795 60 8 3 14 5173. 744 4.320 1. 088 1. 005 366.816 2.461 0. 67 73 391 227 96 - 5 3 9 8040221. 9.816 2. 334 896 565 378 163.579 0 0 43 206 98 33 2 4 2 3880225 19.644 5. 026 1. 414 2. 437 1. 926 508.077 31.614 6. 22 45 198 1740226 12.064 3. 228 384 913 708 271. 181 480 
102 25 6 14 564o. 17 45 262 155 44 7 1 0 5140227 15.251 4.350 395 2. 412 4,008 701. 929 12.235 1.74 34 268 169 89 16 7 6 5890228 11. 326 4,588 ll8 871 401 189,569 5.999 3. 16 12 1730229 164 57 4 1 4 41513.462 5. 706 1. 799 2. 173 1,440 371. 708 10. 680 · 2. 87 56 307 167 70 17 6 15 638 
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Source: DANE, Censo de Servicios Grande, 1970, 
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(196 7 pesos) 
Number of Remunerated Workers 
Blue - Collar White - Collar 







0401 122.475 4219 27 502 69 35.648 16.461 
0402 55.814 3 0 10 3 28.372 0 
0403 88.531 1902 141 802 186 522.345 39. 789 
' . 
0404 21.696 2093 15 253 45 . 57. 041 54.100 
0405 35.488 693 9 195 46 99.820 3.674 
0406 21.057 124 12 45 23 93.410 1. 035 
0407 25.107 1772 74 351 62 52. 708 37.963 
0408 18.195 816 10 . 123 24 28.828 5.245 
Source: DANE, Censo de Canteras y Mineria, 1969 
.~ , -
Table 5 _· 
Government Sector 
1967 
Average Number of Remunerated Workers 
Subsector Remuneration Men Women 
0501 21. 301 2.500 1. 736 
0502 13.483 50.343 3.842 
0503 120.982 188 116 
0504 20. 714 I2. 976 1. 799 
0505 31. 383 282 
. 
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0506 9. 714 6.048 1. 436 
0507 21. 677 4.294 2.366 
0508 23.639 243 224 
0509 24.540 226 116 
0510 30. 933 1.466 282 
0511 254.475 2.834 1. 047 
0512 16.151 847 372 
0513 22. 211 292 203 
Source: DANE, Estadistica Fiscal Administrativa y Financiera, 1966-67, pp. 495-498. 
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